THE MONUMENTAL SANSKRIT epic R am ayan . a functions as an ancient repository of social and moral values which are very much alive today in the Hindu world. The R am ayan . a portrays the legendary exploits of the virtuous warrior-prince R ama. The story has undergone innumerable interpolations, redactions, vernacular translations, and local retellings throughout its vast and dynamic receptive history. The themes thereof, however, have remained quintessential aspects of Hindu thought and culture over the centuries, inspiring art, dance, narrative, and moral instruction, not only in India but across South and Southeast Asia to this day.
1 R ama is regarded within the Hindu tradition as the exemplar of social and moral conduct, serving to define and perpetuate South Asian social values. As Robert Goldman notes, "few works of literature produced at any time have been as popular and influential as the great and ancient Sanskrit epic poem, the V almīki R am ayan . a [which has] entertained, moved, enchanted, and uplifted untold millions of people in India and much of Southeast Asia" (1984: 4) .
The most ancient and influential rendition of the exploits of R ama is ascribed to the primordial poet-sage figure V almīki, and serves as the culmination of a long bardic tradition resulting from an oral composition originating over two millennia ago. V almīki is lauded by the Hindu religious tradition as its adi kavi (first poet). We are told that V almīki, while tranquilly engaged in his ritual bath at the banks of a river one morning, was admiring two beautiful krauñca birds engaged in the act of mating. The scene is sullied when an arrow from a hunter (nis . ada) pierces the breast of the male of the pair, leaving the female to wail in grief for her fallen mate. V almīki is so overwhelmed with pity at the sorrowful sight that the following curse spontaneously springs from his unknowing lips:
2 "Since, nis . ada, you killed one of this pair of krauñcas, distracted at the height of passion, you shall not live very 1 A. K. Ramanujan comments on the astonishing number of retellings of the story of R ama and their vast range of influence over South Asia and South-East Asia. The list of languages in which at least one telling is found is as follows: Annamese, Balinese, Bengali, Cambodian, Chinese, Gujarati, Hindi, Javanese, Kannada, Kashmiri, Khotanese, Laotian, Malaysian, Marathi, Oriya, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Santali, Sinhalese, Tamil, Telugu, Thai, and Tibetan (Ramanujan 1991: 24) .
2 "Then in the intensity of this feeling of compassion (karun . a), the Brahman thought, 'This is wrong.' Hearing the krauñca hen wailing, he uttered these words:" (tatah . karun . aveditv ad adharmo 'yam iti dvijah . | niś amya rudatīm . krauñcīm idam . vacanam abravīt, I.2.13). All translations in this study are taken from the "V almīki R am ayan . a Translation Project" based at Berkeley University (California, USA), of which Robert Goldman is the director and general editor. This project marks a superb and unprecedented effort at yielding a scholarly English translation of the critical edition of the ancient masterpiece. The six volumes and the respective translators are I: B alak aṅ ḋ a (Goldman 1984) , II: Ayodhy ak aṅ ḋ a (Pollock 1986) , III: Araṅ yak aṅ ḋ a (Pollock 1991) , IV: long!" (m a nis . ada pratis . t . am . tvam agamah . ś aśvatīh . sam ah . , yat krauñcamithun ad ekam avadhīh . k amamohitam, I.2.16). This verse is not only indicative of the aesthetic mood of the work, but is also revered as the very first instance of poetry within the Indian subcontinent. It is telling, for our purposes, that poetry itself is derived from grief, and grief born of violence. The sight of wanton violence affronts the sage's moral sensibilities, and though he returns it with an act of violence of his own (albeit an arguably more refined variety), the violence of the hunter is condemned by the text, yet that committed by the sage is not: rather, the violent moment occasioning the hunter's retribution occasions, too, the genesis of poetic verse, and thus constitutes cause for celebration. In a like fashion, V almīki's R am ayan . a functions to contrast proper and improper uses of force. While the epic speaks to many lasting ethical considerations, this study confines itself to one such concern: the legitimization of violence.
When is violent force justified? This question, especially when concerned with the large-scale loss of human life, has rightly occupied religious discourse worldwide over the centuries. A Just War framework evolved from Roman and early Christian thinkers (e.g. Cicero and St. Augustine) and has played a key role in the formation of modern international law. It remains the dominant Western approach, providing straightforward criteria to address some of the most basic question about the use of force. Its criteria can be grouped as follows:
Why use force? Just War requires:
(1) A just cause (2) The right intent (3) A net benefit Who should authorize force? (4) A legitimate authority When can force be used?
(5) As a last resort What level of force?
(6) Proportional means of force How and where to apply force? (7) With right conduct 3 To what extent does the V almīki R am ayan . a include the criteria of the Just War model? In order to address this question, we performed a manual sweep of the epic and isolated all episodes and passages explicitly pertaining to armed force as well as violence more generally. These passages naturally congealed into groups strikingly similar to those of the Just War framework. The vast majority of the ethical conditions relating to violence were directly comparable to at least one of the criteria comprising the Just War model. Furthermore, while our examination of the epic retrieved no explicit discourse corresponding to the Just War framework's "presumption of peace," we did find significant material lauding ahim . s a (nonviolence) and correlated values, such as patience, tolerance, forgiveness, and compassion.
While this examination serves only as one step toward understanding Hindu approaches to armed force, it supports the notion that the themes espoused in the Just War tradition are common to long-standing indigenous Indian deliberations on the ethics of warfare. Rather than an imposition of Western Just War themes, this study shows how very similar ethical considerations assume a distinctly Indian character in the V almīki R am ayan . a. In doing so, the study also indicates the inadequacy of the Just War model to fully address the epic's complex affirmation of peace, a theme which ironically abounds in an epic largely concerned with the legitimization of warfare. This article serves to further incorporate the Hindu ethics of violence into the broader modern global discourse on war and peace.
RELATED SCHOLARSHIP
Despite the recent rise in scholarship on Hinduism and Just War (Clooney 2003; Subedi 2003; Allen 2006; Brekke 2006; Patton 2007; Roy 2009), 4 this collective enterprise pales in comparison to work done on other religious traditions , including Christianity (Johnson 1981) , Islam (Kelsay 2007) , and Buddhism (Bartholomeusz 2002) . Francis Clooney (2003: 109-126) acknowledges that the discussion of a Hindu Just War is still in its infancy; however, he manages to establish the importance in Hinduism of one key Just War criteria: right intention when going to war (jus ad bellum 5 ). Similarly, Nick Allen focuses his insightful study of the Mah abh arata on Just Cause, in addition to discussing the epic's ample supply of parameters for rules of engagement and briefly touching upon issues of Right Authority and Last Resort. But what of the other criteria? Torkel Brekke observes that the Hindu tradition has produced an extensive code of ethics for combat during war (jus in bello) but a relatively meager discourse on jus ad bellum criteria, while the Christian tradition exhibits an inverse emphasis. 6 Is jus ad bellum discourse truly scarce in the Hindu context, or is it merely more subtly voiced? It is our task to probe narratives as richly didactic as the R am ayan . a in search of the ethical discourses encoded within.
This study contends that, Brekke's observation notwithstanding, the absence of ample comparison between the war ethics of India and the West results in large part from the degree to which the Indian discourse is embedded in narratives such as the R am ayan . a, narratives understudied throughout the history of Indological scholarship. While more overtly didactic strata of the Hindu corpus (e.g., Ved anta) have enjoyed far more probing and sustained scholarly attention than narrative texts (especially the pur an . as), it is worth noting that the vast and ongoing career of the R am ayan . a has proved enormously more far-reaching than strands of philosophy intended for, and preserved by, India's social and religious elite.
The discourses on violence embedded in epic narrative, while far less succinct and direct than, for example, Dharmaś astra literature, nevertheless constitute powerful avenues of insight into lasting ethical concerns within Hinduism. Though narrative is often considered descriptive, it is also prescriptive in the Indian context, particularly since the epics are replete with social and moral ideologies (Dhand 2002) . This is especially the case with the R am ayan . a since, as Laurie Patton remarks, the work attempts to integrate violence with R ama's moral perfection (2007) . Given the epic's preoccupation with the legitimization of violence, and its enormous clout as a source of social and moral guidance, it serves as an excellent text to help bridge the lacuna in scholarship regarding the intersection of Just War discourse and Hindu ethics pertaining to armed force.
categories (Just Cause, Right Intent, Legitimate Authority, Net Benefit, and Last Resort), whereas jus in bello corresponds to the last two (Proportionality of Means and Right Conduct).
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In a separate article titled "The Ethics of War and the Concept of War in India and Europe," Brekke (2005) argues that since, in the epic tradition, "war is never properly differentiated from the private duel between heroes," the distinction between "bellum and duellum, which is so important to the Just War tradition, is not made." This phenomena, he concludes, accounts (at least partially) for why "an Indian jus ad bellum comparable to the European tradition never existed" (Brekke 2005: 83) .
A work as popular and influential as the V almīki R am ayan . a has, of course, been subject to modification (interpolation, redaction) from one milieu to another across the sweep of its vast geographical and historical transmission. While historicist and philological analysis has by and large dominated the study of Sanskrit texts, "often occupied with excavating texts for the purpose of reconstructing the chronology of identifiably distinct textual layers" (Black and Geen 2011: 9) , this study employs primarily a literary mode of engagement (similar to that of Black 2011; Geen 2011; Lindquist 2011; Patton 2011) ; that is, we are interested in the epic in its current form, embracing the ideological and creative enterprises of the text's numerous interpolators and redactors. The search for a pristine, "original" text may be as futile as it is unimportant to the concerns of the living tradition which has sculpted the narrative to its current shape in accordance with prevailing values. While little can be certain about the intentions of V almīki (or even of his historical existence), it is clear that the narrative fabric of the V almīki R am ayan . a readily lends itself to discussion of the ethics of violence. Since Hinduism preserves ahim . s a (nonviolence) as an ethical imperative, it is no wonder that the R am ayan . a exhibits so marked an anxiety regarding the use of force, an anxiety which the epic competently addresses through its characterization and dialogue. It is these literary elements to which we turn in search of counsel on the legitimate use of force.
THE JUST WAR CRITERIA Just Cause
This first Just War criterion is arguably the most significant to the model as a whole: there must be an appropriate cause to justify violence. If this is also true of the R am ayan . a, then what specific causes for warfare are cited therein? V almīki informs us very early in the epic that the world is imperiled by evil r aks . asas-i.e., demons-who, by means of violence and magical spells, threaten the sanctity and well-being of the other inhabitants of the planet. Their effort is spearheaded by the demon-king R avan . a, who has come to represent the personification of evil against whose vice R ama's virtue is stanchly contrasted. R avan . a and his entourage terrorize ascetics, interrupting their rituals, thereby causing imbalance in the cosmic order. The Hindu pantheon of gods implore the god Vis . n . u to take incarnation on earth in order to "kill R avan . a in battle, that mighty thorn in the side of the world, for he is . . . a terror to ascetics and a source of lamentation to the world" ( pravr . ddham . lokakan . t . akam . . . samare jahi r avan . am . . . tad . . . vir avan . am . tapasvin am tam . bhay avaham, I.14.17-I.14.21). Violence is condoned in this context, given the necessity of combating the force of evil. Vis . n . u descends during King Daśaratha's ritual sacrifice for progeny, and takes human birth as the warrior-prince R ama.
7 Vis . n . u's ultimate mission (as manifest in the R ama avat ara, i.e., his divine descent) is clear: the defeat of evil and restoration of cosmic balance. The welfare of the world is, undoubtedly, viewed as just cause for violent action. R ama, we are told, is driven by the goal of defending the welfare of all beings.
Born into the ks . atriya (ruler-warrior) caste as the son of King Daśaratha, R ama is authorized to wield violent force in order to combat evil and protect righteousness. Violent means is the privilege, and indeed the duty, of the ks . atriya class, to whom, among the four castes, social governance is entrusted. Both protection and punishment are deemed equally vital to social welfare, without which society would decay. Both are accepted as noble causes for violence, as exemplified at several junctures throughout the text.
During his exile, R ama encounters forest-dwelling sages who remind him of his ks . atriya duty, declaring that "a king who protects his subjects . . . acquires [a quarter] of the supreme righteousness amassed by a sage who lives on nothing but roots and fruit" ( yat karoti param . dharmam . munir mūlaphal aśanah . tatra r ajñaś caturbh agah . . . . raks . atah . , III.5.13). They implore him to carry out his duty and protect them from the menacing r aks . asas. By wielding violence, R ama becomes the sages' refuge from persecution and annihilation, which the text presents as ample cause for the exercise of armed force. Similarly, at the onset of the war between R ama and R avan . a, Vibhīs . an . a, R avan . a's brother and court minister, defects to R ama's army due to the demon-king's arrogance and ethical depravity. Though several of R ama's advisors are suspicious, R ama accepts Vibhīs . an . a without hesitation because "it is a serious transgression to fail to protect those who come seeking shelter" (evam . dos . o mah an atra prapann an am araks . an . e); indeed, one should protect the vulnerable "even at the cost of his own life" ( pr an . an parityajya) (VI.12.15-VI.12.18). As per the dictates of dharma (righteousness), R ama openly welcomes Vibhīs . an . a: the warrior-prince is sworn to "grant protection to all beings who come to [him] for shelter" (sakr . d eva prapann aya tav asmīti ca y acate abhayam . sarvabhūtebhyo dad amy etad vratam . mama, VI.12.20). Protection is privileged over passivity.
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In actuality, Vis . n . u's incarnation peculiarly occurs among Daśaratha's four sons, since his essence is transmitted via a magical porridge from which Daśaratha's three wives eat, in varying proportions, in order to conceive.
By extension, self-preservation is a valid justification for the resort to violence. One must protect oneself against annihilation, especially in order to protect others. An example of this arises in a later episode, in which Hanum an, R ama's staunch simian devotee, is captured in Laṅk a by R avan . a and his entourage. Hanum an cleverly cites self-defense as his justification for killing several of the demonking's warriors (V.48.13), though his official mission in Laṅk a is only one of reconnaissance. Similarly, Vibhīs . an . a defends R ama's killing of the demon Khara by invoking self-defense, stating that "all living creatures must strive to the limit of their strength to save their own lives" (avaśyam . pr an . in am . pr an . a raks . itavy a yath abalam, VI.9.14). Clearly, protection (of both the self and other) warrants the execution of violence. Recall that on the cosmological level, R ama's very incarnation takes place in order to protect his fellow creatures, and to protect dharma itself.
In keeping with the theme of protection, the safety of the collective often trumps other ethical considerations. For example, although the slaughter of a female is highly stigmatized in Sanskrit epic culture (see the "Right Conduct" section), R ama is required to destroy the shedemon T at . ak a (I.24.13-I.24.19), who poses a threat to the great sage Viśv amitra, one of R ama's early mentors. The sage urges R ama to slaughter the she-demon without reservation, although doing so is generally considered morally reprehensible and against the code of the warrior. The fact that the text so explicitly argues against the slaying of a woman indicates that violence in the text is far from haphazard, but rather is executed deliberately and thoughtfully, with proper cause. Sage Viśv amitra urges R ama to kill her and not be "soft-hearted about killing a woman" (strīvadhakr . te ghr . n . a, I.24.15). Viśv amitra proceeds to cite precedents of great men who killed females for a greater cause (I.24.17-I.24.18), declaring in summation that "many other great and excellent men killed women who were set in the ways of unrighteousness" (etaiś c anyaiś ca bahubhī r ajaputramah atmabhih . adharmanirat a n aryo hat ah . purus . asattamaih . , I.24.19). The threat that T at . ak a poses toward other beings outweighs considerations of gender with respect to ks . atriya dharma. Viśv amitra commands him to "kill this utterly dreadful and wicked yaks . a [demon] woman whose valor is employed for evil purposes" (en am duvr . tt am yaks . īm . paramad arun . am jahi dus . t . apar akram am, I.24.13), especially given the immemorial responsibility of "a king's son [to] act for the welfare of the four great social orders" (c aturvarn . yahit arth aya kartavyam . r ajasūnun a, I.24.15). It is worth noting that this specific responsibility (i.e., collective welfare) does not belong exclusively to sovereigns. The text later instructs that social harmony is a responsibility of the entire collective, stating that "all [should] unite to destroy [the] one whose deeds are brutal and perverse" (karma lokaviruddham . tu kurv an . am . . . . tīks . n . am . sarvajano hanti, III.28.4). But the text does not call the whole of society to arms: ks . atriyas alone may exercise force, and only when presented with reasonable cause.
Violence is sanctioned as a means of punishment as well as a means of protection and self-defense. For example, R ama executes the monkey-king, V alin, for the sake of upholding righteousness. He metes out punishment to V alin for his adulterous transgressions as well as to fulfill a promise to his ally Sugrīva. In a lengthy speech, R ama declares that "the right of punishing and rewarding" (nigrah anugrah av api IV.18.6) belongs to the kings of the earth, who retain the right to "duly chastise whoever strays from the path of righteousness" (te vayam . m argavibhras . t . am . . . . nigr . hn . īmo yath avidhi IV.18.11). Yet this does not appear to constitute license for rulers to issue punishment on a whim. R ama is careful to invoke the law which states that V alin's crimespecifically, adultery with his brother's wife-was a crime punishable by death. As R ama declares, "death is the punishment prescribed for a man who out of lust approaches his daughter, sister, or younger brother's wife" (aurasīm . bhaginīm . v api bh ary am . v apy anujasya yah . pracareta narah . k am at tasya dan . d . o vadhah . smr . tah . , IV.18.22). R ama consoles the dying V alin that neither he who punishes nor he who is punished truly perishes, since "each serves the due process of justice" (k aryak aran . asiddh arth av) (IV.18.53-IV.18.55). Thus, punishment of gross ethical transgressions validates the application of lethal force.
Even the ideal kingdom requires arms. In Book II, V almīki portrays a utopia in Ayodhy a, the capital city of the idyllic kingdom of Kośala; yet it is described as well armed. Though Ayodhy a is prosperous, refined, and peaceful, we are told that it contained every implement and weapon (I.5.10) and its king, Daśaratha, had thousands of great chariot warriors with great fighting skills. Even a utopia must be protected from external threat; similarly, internal threats must be met with punishment, but in a reasonable and humane manner. We are told that in Ayodhy a, the king's administrators would, "if the occasion demanded, punish their own sons" ( pr apta k alam . yath a dan . d . am . dh arayeyuh . sutes . v api, I.7.7) and that they "were constant protectors of all honest inhabitants of the realm" (śucīn am raks . it araś ca nityam . vis . ayav asin am, 1.7.9). The V almīki R am ayan . a asserts that protection and punishment, when alloyed with reason, represent sanctioned and necessary expressions of violence.
Right Intent
The second criterion comprising the Just War framework is Right Intent, which can be interpreted as having a pure motivation to support righteousness, independent of selfish desires. Another interpretation in the Just War tradition is that war be implemented only for the sake of peace. The demon R avan . a's "rationale" for violence is thoroughly condemned insofar as it is senselessly self-serving and conflict-provoking. 8 By contrast, what can we gage about the intention of the noble warrior R ama? On the day of his would-be coronation, upon being wrongfully sentenced to fourteen years of forest exile, R ama had ample opportunity to exercise force for the sake of his own self-interest. He is even urged to do so by his brother, the passionate Laks . man . a, who insists that they should right the wrong by forcefully seizing the throne. However, R ama rejects this advice and gracefully acquiesces to his sentence of exile, seemingly disinterested in personal comfort or entitlement. For R ama, the loss of kingship and all of its amenities does not constitute right intent for the use of force.
The prince regent's motives appear consistently noble overall, but are not without blemish. The episode narrating R ama's slaughter of V alin is far more questionable, specifically regarding the selflessness of R ama's intentions. In Book IV, Kis . kindh ak an . d . a, R ama defeats V alin, having forged an alliance with V alin's brother, Sugrīva. R ama and Sugrīva had pledged mutual allegiance and aid in the recovery of their respective wives. Thus, R ama is clearly motivated by self-interest. However, clearly conscious of the ethical conundrum, V almīki articulates intentions on R ama's behalf which transcend the sphere of selfinterest. V alin himself, on the verge of death, inquires about R ama's motivation for killing him, wondering what possible merit could be gained thereby. V almīki, speaking through the dying lord of the monkey-men, indicates that kings must act in accordance with noble intentions, including "conciliation, generosity, forbearance, righteousness, truthfulness, steadiness, and courage, as well as punishment of wrongdoers" (s ama d anam . ks . am a dharmah . satyam . dhr . tipar akramau p arthiv an am . gun . a r ajan dan . d . aś c apy apak aris . u, IV.17.25) and that they "must not act capriciously" (na nr . p ah . k amavr . ttayah . , IV.17.28). At this juncture, R ama maintains that he acted in the interest of his duty to punish evil-doers. That the text anticipates and defends against the charge that R ama's motives are solely self-serving bespeaks an insistence on nobility of intent whilst engaging in violent force.
Net Benefit
The third Just War criterion asks: is the fighting worth the cost? During their forest exile, Sīt a cautions R ama against the overall use of arms, highlighting the delusion that can arise from the possession of weaponry. She seems to be asking whether or not violence, however justified, is worth the risk it poses. She relays the tale of an ascetic who, upon receiving a sword as a gift, becomes obsessed with the weapon, carrying it everywhere. He eventually turns violent, forgetting his ascetic vow of ahim . s . a. Delighting in wanton violence, his barbaric tendencies serve to rupture his virtue and amassed merit (tapas), causing him to eventually end up in hell (III.8.13-III.8.19). Hence, nothing good came of the weapon. Sīt a relays the tale to question the benefit of violence. For the sage, there was no benefit, and only detriment. Ironically, R ama employs violence to secure, rather than to compromise, the religiosity of the sages. It is the r aks . asas who thwart their work by desecrating their sacrificial altars. The benefit of protecting the sages is clear, and well worth the exercise of force.
V almīki also considers the benefits and drawbacks of battle through Hanum an, who wonders aloud what intelligent person would haphazardly engage in an affair such as warfare whose outcome is so uncertain (V.28.35)-indeed, none can predict the outcome of combat. Nevertheless, the valiant Hanum an pledges allegiance to R ama, an act signifying for him that the potential benefit of the war outweighs its cruel uncertainly. Hanum an's musings occur long before the onset of battle, when there is great margin for speculation. However, soon into the war, the demise of the r aks . asas becomes easily foreseeable, and on this basis R avan . a's greatuncle and minister, M alyav an, reminds him that "a king who is weaker than his rival or equal to him in strength should sue for peace [and] only one who is stronger should make war, but even he must never underestimate his enemy" (hīyam anena kartavyo r ajñ a sandhih . samena ca na śatrum avamanyeta jy ay an kurvīta vigraham, VI.26.8). M alyav an's concern is a pragmatic one. What is to be gained from continuing the war? In the case of the r aks . asas, where defeat is inevitable, a sensible ruler heeding the net benefit argument would have happily surrendered. R ama, on the other hand, engages in violent combat not only for the rescue of his cruelly imperiled wife, but for the sake of righteousness (dharma) itself. As the avat ara of the god Vis . n . u, R ama's earthly purpose is to destroy R avan . a and his entourage who threaten the rituals of the ascetics, rituals which maintain the welfare of the world. It is important to bear in mind the inextricability of the "cosmic" and "human" narratives in the V almīki R am ayan . a. Sheldon Pollock argues on the basis of the epic's narrative logic ( particularly with respect to the tale's boon motif ) that R ama must simultaneously be a divine and human being, and so, too, must the concerns of each setting be intertwined (1984) . While at face value, the tale of R ama easily appears to fit the ancient trope of a prince recapturing his princess from the clutches of evil, the details are dependent upon the necessities of the grander narrative, whereby R ama must destroy R avan . a in the interest of cosmic balance. For example, we are told that during R avan . a's assault on Sīt a, "perfected beings cried out 'This is the end of R avan . a!'" (etad anto daśagrīva iti siddh as tad a 'bruvan, III.52.10); furthermore, Sīt a explicitly voices the same during her captivity: "I know for certain I could never have been stolen away from the wise R ama, were it not that Fate had destined it-to bring about your death!" (n apahartum aham . śaky a tasya r amasya dhīmatah . vidhis tava vadh arth aya vihito n atra sam . śayah . , V.20.21). It is through the backdrop of this cosmic narrative that one appreciates the ultimate benefit of R ama's cause.
Legitimate Authority
The fourth Just War criterion concerns the following question: can force be rightfully decided upon and implemented by anyone? The society of the V almīki R am ayan . a accepts both filial piety and the authority of the king. Elders are invariably respected. R ama even renounces his right to kingship and agrees to dwell in the wilderness merely because his father (also his king) asks him to do so. In obeying his father's command, he cites the precedents of two noble individuals committing deplorable acts. The first one slays a cow, a highly revered animal in Indian culture, and the second slays his own mother, both at the behest of their father (II.18.27-II.18.29). These abhorrent and shocking acts are justified in the name of obedience and respect for authority. When later confronted by the impassioned Laks . man . a, R ama instructs his younger brother that their father's command "is based on righteousness and is absolute" and that "having once heard a father's command, a mother's, or a Brahman's, one must not disregard it" (dharmasam . śritam etac ca pitur vacanam uttamam sam . śrutya ca pitur v akyam . m atur v a br ahman . asya v a na kartavyam . vr . th a, II.18.34) under any circumstances. On the familial level, one must obey one's parents and elders. Laks . man . a imposes fourteen years of exile upon himself in order to accompany and serve his elder brother. Similarly, wives respect the authority of their husbands, and Sīt a insists upon the same fourteen-year sentence out of reverence for her husband.
Obedience also extends from the social level to the priestly class. R ama declares to the dying monkey-king, V alin, that for righteousness to be in effect, "an older brother, a father, and a bestower of learningthese three are to be regarded as father [and furthermore that] a younger brother, one's own son, and also a pupil with good qualitiesthese three are to be thought of as one's sons" ( jyes . t . ho bhr at a pit a caiva yaś ca vidy am . prayacchati trayas te pitaro jñey a . . . yavīy an atmanah . putrah . śis . yaś c api gun . oditah . putravat te trayaś cinty a, IV.18.13-IV.18.14). Human society is stratified according to gender, age, and caste. In ancient India, the ks . atriya caste is the only one that can wield weapons and apply force for protection and punishment.
Upon entering into the wilderness, R ama encounters a community of ashrams where ascetics of various kinds dwell. The hermitages comprised religious virtuosos who, having themselves renounced violence, implore R ama to exercise his authority to protect them against the deadly malice of the r aks . asas (III.5.7-III.5.20). Kings ( part of the ks . atriya caste) are referred to as guardians of righteousness, possessing legitimate authority to exercise power. The king rightfully uses force to protect his subjects and "wields the staff of punishment" (dan . d . adharo, III.1.17). To again refer to R ama's address to the dying v anara-king, he declares, in his own defense, that a ruler's duty is to "duly chastise whoever strays from the path of righteousness" (te vayam . m argavibhras . t . am . svadharme parame sthit ah . bharat ajñ am . puraskr . tya nigr . hn . īmo yath avidhi, IV.18.11). Clearly, the use of force is contingent upon authority in this cultural context, or else all castes within society would be permitted to wield arms.
However, we ought to note that the text offers a highly idealized portrayal of kingship, where the king is self-composed, true to his word, and attentive to moral precepts. It is unclear whether kings should be allotted this authority categorically, or whether they do so by their inherent merit. That R ama is portrayed as personage of great virtue could be read as the basis of legitimization of his authority. The text in no way, for example, repudiates Vibhīs . an . a for defecting to his king's (R avan . a) enemy in the midst of war. The authority of the king is arguably inextricable from his presumed virtue.
Last Resort
The fifth Just War criterion stipulates that all possible attempts at peace must be exhausted prior to engagement in warfare. R ama is described as one who is not quick to anger; he therefore does not readily rely on violent means. He is by nature kind and compassionate, prepared to "ignore a hundred injuries, so great [is] his self-control" (na smaraty apak ar an . am śatam apy atmavattay a, II.1.16). As mentioned above, when he is sentenced to exile on the very day of his would-be coronation, he peacefully and graciously accepts his fate. By contrast, Laks . man . a, his younger, rasher brother, emphatically suggests that they violently "seize control of the government" (t avad eva may a s ardham atmastham . kuru ś asanam, II.18.8) since "leniency always ends in defeat" (mr . dur hi paribhūyate, II.18.11). Laks . man . a's youth, brashness, and passion are consistently juxtaposed with R ama's equanimity, wisdom, and poise. R ama refuses to heed his brother's exhortations, and insists on going peacefully. Violence is never a first recourse for R ama. He addresses the idea of violent action against his father, the king, by directly denouncing it, construing violence as action opposed to righteousness (dharma) itself and urging Laks . man . a to relinquish his "ignoble notion that is based on the code of the ks . atriya [and instead to] base his actions on righteousness, not violence" (tad en am . visr . j an ary am . ks . atradharm aśrit am . matim dharmam aśraya m a taiks . -n . yam . madbuddhir anugamyat am, II.18.36). So distant is violence from R ama's first recourse that he goes so far as to publicly repudiate the very duty of the warrior.
Ironically, once Sīt a, R ama's beloved wife, is abducted, it is R ama who becomes uncharacteristically enraged and unsound, and it is Laks . man . a who reminds him that he has "always been mild in the past, self-restrained, and dedicated to the welfare of all creatures" ( pur a bhūtv a mr . dur d antah . sarvabhūtahite ratah . , III.61.4). He then urges R ama to maintain composure since "lords of the earth must be gentle and cool-headed, and must mete out just punishment" ( yuktadan . d . a hi mr . davah . praś ant a vasudh adhip ah . , III.61.9). V almīki here voices his sage counsel on the ethics of force through Laks . man . a, who counsels his elder brother to first resort to "peaceful means, by conciliation, tact, or diplomacy" and to resort to violence only if these fail (śīlena s amn a vinayena sīt am . nayena na pr apsyasi cen narendra tatah . samuts adaya hemapuṅkhair mahendra vajrapratimaih . śaraughaih . , III.61.16).
Later in the text, when it is Laks . man . a who is enraged, R ama advises him to destroy evil by virtue, and to first exhaust "affection and friendship" using "conciliatory words, avoiding harshness" (s amopahitay a v ac a rūks . an . i parivarjayan vaktum arhasi sugrīvam . vyatītam . k alaparyaye, IV.30.8). Although martial valor is extolled in the text, violence is by no means the "higher ground." Whoever is the mouthpiece-whether R ama, Laks . man . a, or even the r aks . asas-V almīki's criteria for the legitimate execution of armed force is derived from an esteem for peace that resounds throughout the work.
The text at several junctures explicitly insists that one must exhaust peaceful means prior to relying upon force. Hanum an, upon arriving in Laṅk a on his quest to find Sīt a, considers various options but rejects them as unworkable in that situation. He states that "when it comes to the r aks . asas, there is no scope for conciliation, nor is there any scope for bribery, sowing dissention, or open warfare" (avak aśo na s antvasya r aks . ases . v abhigamyate na d anasya na bhedasya naiva yuddhasya dr . śyate, V.2.27). The four traditional escalatory steps (up ayas) found in the Indian epics are: s ama (conciliation), d ana (gifts), bheda (dissention), and dan . d . a ( punishment).
9 As Hanum an is leaving Sīt a (who is held captive in the demon capital), he thinks to himself (V.39.3-V.39.4):
Conciliation does not yield good results in the case of the r aks . asas, nor are gifts appropriate in the case of those who have amassed great wealth. Dissension can have no effect on people who are proud of their strength. Physical force alone presents itself to me in this case. Indeed, no resolution other than physical force will be possible in this matter.
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That Hanum an considers nonviolent approaches to deal with demonic instigators underlines an insistence that violence be pursued only as a last resort. Hanum an concludes that he should engage the r aks . asa forces to test their strength and to make them more pliant (V.39.5). After allowing his tail to be lit on fire at R avan . a's order, Hanum an uses it to set fire to buildings in Laṅk a.
Last Resort even has a place among the r aks . asas. During the great war to regain Sīt a, R avan . a is chastized by his own brother, Vibhīs . an . a, who at the first war counsel reminds the lord of the r aks . asas that "the learned have prescribed as appropriate the use of force only on those occasions where one's objective cannot be achieved by means of the other three stratagems" (apy up ayais tribhis t ata yo 'rthah . pr aptum . na śakyate tasya vikramak al am . s t an yukt an ahur manīs . in . ah . , VI.9.8). Similarly, another of R avan . a's brothers, the giant, Kumbhakarn . a, informs us that "the self-possessed monarch should consult with his ministers concerning the timely use of bribery, conciliation, sowing dissension, coercive force, or any combination of these means, as well 9 See, for example, Mah abh arata V.148.8-V.148.16; Manu Smr . ti 7.107-7.108. 10 na s ama raks . ah . su gun . aya kalpate na d anam arthopacites . u vartate; na bhedas adhy a baladarpit a jan ah . par akramas tv es . a mameha rocate; na c asya k aryasya par akram ad r . te viniścayah . kaścid ihopapadyate.
as the proper and improper ways of applying them" (upaprad anam . s antvam . v a bhedam . k ale ca vikramam yogam ca raks . as am . śres . t . ha t av ubh au ca nay anayau, VI.51.11). Like Vibhīs . an . a, he makes reference to the three other classical means for conflict resolution. All of Vibhīs . an . a's attempts to avert the war fail as the utterly self-engrossed r aks . asa lord refuses to heed his advice. R avan . a returns the sage counsel with insults, causing Vibhīs . an . a to defect to R ama's army. Vibhīs . an . a's actions dually signify that warfare should be averted wherever possible, and furthermore, if warfare becomes inevitable, it is imperative to fight on the side of the righteous. The text clearly prioritized peaceful means over violent conflict, when possible.
Proportionality of Means
This criterion suggests that one should exert force only to a degree commensurate with the assault or crime. The V almīki R am ayan . a offers an idyllic portrayal of the kingdom of Kośala, where the authorities "would not harm even a hostile man, if he had done no wrong" (ahitam . c api purus . am . na vihim . syur adūs . akam, I.7.8) and meted out strict punishment "only after considering the relative gravity of a man's offense" (sutīks . n . adan . d . ah . sam . preks . ya purus . asya bal abalam, I.7.10). This esteem for proportionality is mirrored even in the demon kingdom. R avan . a's advisors caution him against slaying the emissary Hanum an (V.56.126-V.56.127), stating that only when an emissary has committed some grave offence may punishment be dispensed. Punishment in such a case may include disfigurement but may never rightfully entail execution. R avan . a relents to Vibhīs . an . a's counsel, admitting that "to kill a messenger is indeed reprehensible" (dūtavadhy a vigarhit a, V.51.2) and decides instead to merely punish Hanum an. He devises a punishment which he deems commensurate to the crime, declaring (V.51.3-V.51.4):
It is said that the tail is the monkey's most cherished possession . . . therefore let his [tail] be set alight immediately . . . let all his kinsmen and relations, his friends and those dear to him, see him dejected and drawn by the disfigurement of his tail.
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R avan . a seeks to shame and disfigure Hanum an, though he refrains from taking his life. That R avan . a seeks to distort the prized possession of the monkey-man without inflicting fatal harm on him is congruent with an element of proportionality of the means of force, though it also suggests malicious intent. Ironically, Hanum an suffers no permanent disfigurement and even employs his flaming tail as an instrument to set fire to the city of Laṅk a.
Proportionality of means is also demonstrated in R ama's encounter with the she-demon Śūrpan . akh a, the sister of R avan . a. Because of her lust for R ama, Śūrpan . akh a becomes greatly envious of Sīt a, who is the sole object of R ama's romantic affection, and threatens to devour Sīt a before R ama's very eyes to procure his attention. As she pounces upon Sīt a, R ama forcefully restrains her and instructs Laks . man . a to disfigure her. Note that R ama does not call for her execution. Laks . man . a proceeds to cut off her ears and nose (III.17.15-III.17.23). Unlike the killing of the monkey-king, V alin, Śūrpan . akh a's life was spared, presumably due to the relative levity of her offence. Sīt a, after all, remained unscathed throughout the ordeal. Soon thereafter the maimed Śūrpan . akh a appears before her brother's court and manipulates him to avenge her mutilation. She cunningly conveys the allure of Sīt a so as to incite her brother's uncontrollable desire, thus causing R avan . a's abduction of Sīt a, which results in the war with Laṅk a and the demon's fateful demise.
Right Conduct
Criterion seven pertains to ethics during actual fighting. The warrior's code of honor is paramount throughout the V almīki R am ayan . a. Though R ama's ethical conduct is largely considered exemplary, it is not unblemished. Among R ama's controversial actions is the slaughter of the she-demon, T at . ak a, an act which outright violates the warrior's code since females are generally not to be killed. For example, Bharata, outraged at his mother's malicious conniving to deprive R ama of the throne in order to give it to her son, states, "if any creature is not to be slain, it is a woman. Forbear! I would kill this woman myself, this evil, wicked Kaikeyī, were it not that righteous R ama would condemn me for matricide" (avadhy ah . sarvabhūt an am . pramad ah . ks . amyat am iti hany am aham im am . p ap am . kaikeyīm . dus . t . ac arin . īm yadi m am . dh armiko r amo n asūyen m atr . gh atakam, II.72.20-II.72.21). Similarly, the slaughter of his warrior-son Indrajit so angered R avan . a that he threatened the life of the captive Sīt a. His minister Sup arśva succeeds in diffusing his wrath, invoking proper conduct to dissuade him from the heinous crime of killing a woman (VI.80.52-VI.80.56).
Other episodes exemplify key elements of proper conduct as advanced in the text. The ks . atriya code of conduct is breached in Kis . kindh a, the realm of the monkey-men. R ama, highly sympathetic to Sugrīva's loss of kingdom and wife, forges an alliance with him against his brother V alin. R ama agrees to slay V alin. However, he does so by shooting his arrows from the bushes, where he is concealed at the sidelines, while V alin and Sugrīva are engaged in combat. R ama's conduct, engaging an enemy while being concealed, highly problematizes the warrior's code which he so staunchly upholds throughout the epic. He is reproached at great length by the dying V alin who considers it a cruel act, bereft of discretion. R ama provides a lengthy rationale for his act but in no way claims that this justifies his questionable method. He makes no argument against the necessity of the accepted ethics of combat, but rather argues that those ethics do not apply while humans engage with animals. He reminds V alin that men "in hiding or out in the open" (nar ah . praticchann aś ca dr . śy aś ca) attack various beasts whether they "run away terrified or confidently stand still" (mr . g an pradh avit an v a vitrast an visrabdh an ativis . t . hit an), whether "attentive or inattentive or even facing the other way" and that there is "nothing wrong with this" ( pramatt an apramatt an v a nar a m am . s arthino bhr . śam vidhyanti vimuk am . ś c api na ca dos . o 'tra vidyate, IV.18.34-IV.18.35). By regarding V alin as subhuman in this context, R ama cleverly defends against his breach of warrior conduct, which is stringently adhered to by himself and other warriors throughout the epic.
Once V alin is executed, months pass and Sugrīva neglects to fulfill his end of his bargain; he fails to dispatch a search party for Sīt a. R ama becomes exceedingly worried and agitated, and sends Laks . man . a to deliver a message threatening to slay Sugrīva, along with his family, if he does not honor their pact. He urges the newly reinstated lord of monkey-men to heed "the immemorial code of righteous conduct" ( pratiśrutam . dharmam aveks . ya ś aśvatam . IV.29.51). Promise-keeping is a major obligation in the warrior's code of honor. Recall that R ama's entire ordeal-his acceptance of life in the forest, and all of his subsequent hardships-stem from the importance of obeying his father's word in granting the misguided boons to R ama's youngest step-mother, Kaikeyī.
At the court of Laṅk a, Vibhīs . ana-who is described as "always committed to proper conduct" (k aryavidhau sthitah . , V.50.3)-counsels R avan . a against the execution of the emissary Hanum an since it would be "contrary to righteousness" (dharmaviruddham . , V.50.5); indeed, "the virtuous do not advocate killing an emissary" (na dūtavadhy am . pravadanti santo, V.50.6) since "a messenger never deserves death" (na dūto vadham arhati, V.50.11). While R avan . a agrees to a lesser punishment, Vibhīs . ana becomes frustrated by R avan . a's insistence on rejecting virtuous counsel.
Warriors abided by the rules of warfare as prescribed by ś astric injunctions. For example, the warriors at Ayodhy a "would never loose their arrows upon a foe who is isolated from his comrades, the sole support of his family, in hiding, or in flight" ( ye ca b an . air na vidhyanti viviktam apar aparam śabdavedhyam . ca vitatam . laghuhast a viś arad ah . , I.5.20) Also, during the great war in Laṅk a, R ama proclaims to Laks . man . a that "a foe who does not resist, is in hiding, cups his hands in supplication, approaches seeking refuge, is fleeing, or is caught off guard-[one] must not slay any of these" (ayudhyam anam . pracchannam . pr añjalim . śaran . agatam pal ayantam . pramattam . v a na tvam . hantum ih arhasi, VI.67.38). Engagement in battle is a highly systematized endeavor in these contexts. The R am ayan . a definitely upholds the necessity for appropriate conduct whilst engaging in battle.
THE UNJUST WAR: SAGE COUNSEL AT THE COURT
OF RĀVAN . A V almīki's overwhelming concern for just warfare, as evidenced by the inclusion of the seven criteria, is especially apparent in Book VI, Yuddhak an . d . a, "The Book of War." Given that several dialogues in Laṅk a contained in this book deal explicitly with the themes of statecraft and warfare, they have been given their own section in this article. The material therein serves to bolster several Just War considerations, particularly the criterion upon which the ethical system hinges: Just Cause. Goldman notes in the introductory essay that:
The Yuddhak an . d . a is not entirely devoted to the strategies and conduct of war . . . the Book's narrative offers many opportunities for discussions of statecraft, [and] moral and ethical debates. . . . The principal junctures for the exposition and discussion of ethical and expedient conduct are the councils . . . when the leaders, R ama and R avan . a, are confronted with crises and calamities and are forced to make critical decisions. (van Nooten 2009: 28) At three of these critical decision-making junctures-the two councils at the court of Laṅk a and in R avan . a's encounter with Kumbhakarn . a-V almīki demonstrates the irrefutable unrighteousness of the villain's cause, and, by contrast, the righteousness inherent in the cause of the hero R ama. V almīki reinforces R avan . a's villainous nature throughout the book by repeatedly calling attention to the injustice of so unethical a motive for waging war as forcefully coveting the wife of another. Ironically, at these pivotal junctures, the poet delivers his sage counsel on the nature of war and peace by using three of the demonking's closest kinsmen as mouthpieces. The three are: his brother, Vibhīs . an . a; his great-uncle M alyav an; and another of his brothers, the giant warrior Kumbhakarn . a. These three exchanges articulate a concern underscored throughout the epic, i.e., that violence never be deployed in the absence of just cause, and conversely, that it must be readily deployed in defense of righteousness.
The first of the two r aks . asa war councils takes place before R ama and his army cross the ocean, well before the deployment of weapons. The very existence of a prewar council is significant: war ought not to arise from rashness or impulse, but, rather, from careful and methodical consideration. So great is the necessity for counsel in times of war that even the self-absorbed R avan . a respectfully requests his ministers' advice, declaring that "those who are venerable and wise say that counsel is the cornerstone of victory." If it is ironic that the rash and self-absorbed monarch would humble himself before his ministers for deliberation about the prospect of war, the allegedly sagacious "advice" he receives from among that congregation is also befittingly ironic. While the r aks . asa council enthusiastically assure R avan . a of his prowess and inevitable victory-thus further inciting his arrogance and misguided sense of invincibility-R avan . a's own brother, Vibhīs . an . a, dares to offer sensible counsel (VI.9.12-VI.9.13, 15-16, 19-20, 22): By no means, night roaming r aks . asas, should we rashly underestimate our foes; for their forces and valor are immeasurable. And what offence had R ama previously committed against the king of the r aks . asas that the latter should have abducted that illustrious man's wife? 12 . . . Vaidehī 13 constitutes a grave danger to us. She who has been abducted must be surrendered. There is no point in acting merely to provoke a quarrel. It would therefore not be appropriate for us to engage in pointless hostility with this powerful and righteous man. You must give Maithilī back to him . . . .
14 If you do not of your own free will give back R ama's beloved wife, the city of Laṅk a and all of its valiant r aks . asas will surely perish. As your kinsman, I beseech you. Do as I say. What I am telling you is both salutary and beneficial . . . .
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Give up your wrath, so destructive of both happiness and righteousness. Practice righteousness, which is conducive to pleasures and fame. Calm yourself, that we may survive together with our sons and kinsmen. You must give Maithilī back to D aśaratha. 16 Vibhīs . an . a advises his king to surrender Sīt a, who is being sought by both sides. Insofar as she is the object of dispute, she is also the proximate cause of the war. The war does not begin with R ama's siege of Laṅk a, but rather originates from R avan . a's malicious abduction of Sīt a, which we are told is the mundane impetus for R ama's cosmic conquest of R avan . a, evil personified. It is that very misdeed which Vibhīs . an . a addresses as an unjust cause for warfare. He argues that Sīt a's abduction was unwarranted, and that R ama had committed no previous offence against the lord of the r aks . asas, save for the slaying of the demon Khara, which according to Vibhīs . an . a was in self-defense, and thus justified. This confirms the twin notions that violence must be sanctioned by just cause, and that self-defense is a legitimate cause for the use of force.
Once the war is underway and R ama and his troops have made headway toward Laṅk a, R avan . a holds another council. Yet again his r aks . asa ministers assure him that victory is inevitable and prod him to continue on his path of destruction. However, reason is again voiced by one of R avan . a's kinsmen. Similar to Vibhīs . an . a's courageous challenge, M alyav an (the paternal uncle of R avan . a's mother) challenges the ethical foundation of the war (VI.26.6-VI.26.8):
Your majesty, a king who is well versed in the traditional branches of learning and who acts in accordance with sound policy will long exercise sovereignty and bring his foes under his power. And if he makes peace or war with his enemies at the appropriate times and strengthens his own side, he will thus enjoy broader sovereignty. A king who is weaker than his rival or equal to him in strength should sue for peace.
Only one who is stronger should make war, but even he must never underestimate his enemy. Vidy asv abhivinīto yo r aj a r ajan nay anugah . sa ś asti ciram aiśvaryam arīm . ś ca kurute vaśe; sam . dadh ano hi k alena vigr . hn . am . ś c aribhih . saha svapaks . avardhanam . kurvan mahad aiśvaryam aśnute; hīyam anena kartavyo r ajñ a sam . dhih . samena ca na śatrum avamanyeta jy ay an kurvīta vigraham.
M alyav an launches an argument based on the inevitability of defeat and a consideration of net benefit. Just as Vibhīs . an . a insisted upon the return of Sīt a to avert the war, so too does M alyav an insist upon her return to avert further destruction and salvage what is left of the city of Laṅk a. Thus, they both recommend that R avan . a make peace with R ama. While Vibhīs . an . a offered his counsel when war was a mere possibility and not yet a reality, emphasizing the unrighteousness of their cause, M alyav an somewhat sidesteps the question of righteousness at this later stage of the game. Given that armed conflict has already arisen, he focuses on the necessity for survival, emphasizing the inevitability of defeat. This is reminiscent of the category of Net Benefit and the component "reasonable prospect of success," for which there is little chance for the r aks . asas.
The third and final juncture examined here occurs after much destruction has taken place. R avan . a, desperate for aid, decides to awaken his brother, the giant Kumbhakarn . a who sleeps for six-month intervals. Upon lamenting his dire predicament (for the war has taken several turns for the worse since the second council), he sues for the giant's assistance in the war. Kumbhakarn . a delivers a lengthy speech in which he severely chastizes R avan . a for not heeding the advice of his ministers and for being blinded by arrogance and committing wicked acts without reflection. Kumbhakarn . a condemns such rash, selfish disregard for counsel as "unsound policy" since it is opposed to "the texts on polity." Such wanton passion is unbefitting the ideal monarch. The giant informs us that (VI.51.12-VI.51.13; VI.51.20):
He who . . . practices righteousness, profit, and pleasure at their appropriate times never comes to grief in this world. And the king who, together with ministers who understand the true nature of things and have this interest at heart, deliberates over what he ought and ought not to do in this world in order to achieve a beneficial result thrives. . . . And so a king who underestimates his enemy and fails to protect himself meets with calamities and falls from his lofty state.
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The giant rebukes R avan . a not only for ignoring the sage advice offered in the war councils, but also for his "wicked deed" that caused the calamity, i.e., the fateful abduction of Sīt a. However, unlike both Vibhīs . an . a and M alyav an, Kumbhakarn . a appears oblivious to or unconcerned with the inevitability of R avan . a's defeat, though he eventually submits to R avan . a's request and agrees to fight on his behalf. Interestingly, he in no way appeals to R avan . a to end the conflict, and, unlike his two fellow interlocutors, makes no plea for R avan . a to return the wife of R ama. Perhaps his omission is indicative that the conflict has escalated to a point of no return. Instead, he rebukes the lord of the r aks . asas for having gone to war in the first place. He also invokes three of the four purus . arthas, the aims of human life sanctioned in classical Hindu philosophy, 19 harshly criticizing R avan . a for not "taking to heart" which of these aims deserves priority in dharma or righteousness. Since the war being waged presents R avan . a with no economic gain, he must not be motivated by artha. That leaves only k ama, which is pleasure, and desire. R avan . a was desirous of R ama's wife, and his desire threatened to destroy him. Kumbhakarn . a's central critique of the lord of the r aks . asas is his selfish lack of awareness and foresight. Blinded by k ama, R avan . a remains heedless to ś astric injunctions and is deaf to the advice of his learned ministers. He wages a war born of desire, which by its very hedonistically selfish nature precludes concern for righteousness, or the welfare of the kingdom at large.
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With respect to his ultimate indifference to the dictates of dharma, R avan . a is the antithesis of the self-composed R ama, who effortlessly surrenders his own throne for fourteen years for the sake of dharma. R avan . a, on the other hand, would not even sacrifice the ill-begotten wife of another for the sake of protecting his entire kingdom and his multitude of r aks . asa subjects. Thus, the diatribes of Kumbhakarn . a, Vibhīs . an . a, and M alyav an constitute a thematic triangulation of critique: R avan . a, drunk with desire, demonstrates his moral depravity by waging a war entirely ungrounded in ś astra (scriptural authority), lacking just cause, and detrimental to the fabric of dharma. His vice also serves to define by contrast R ama's unblemished virtue. V almīki's concern for just warfare as exemplified in Yuddhak an . d . a is evident, and rings true centuries later, as victory in the battle of R ama over R avan . a is celebrated to this day.
19
These are profit (artha), pleasure (k ama), righteousness (dharma), and moks . a, emancipation from the wheel of sam . s ara, rebirth, a concept about which the epic is conspicuously silent. There is much debate about whether the author(s) of the epic were aware of this classical Hindu worldview, which is exemplified quite clearly in the Mah abh arata.
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Anantanand Rambachan (2003: 116) differentiates dharma-yuddha (the righteous war, for example, as waged by R ama and the heroes of the Mah abh arata) from the k ama-yuddha (war based on desire) and the artha-yuddha (war undertaken for material gain).
CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF JUST WAR CRITERIA
The V almīki R am ayan . a is an epic tale of a warrior-prince's valorous rescue of his abducted wife. It is also a tale of the descent of divinity to destroy cosmic evil on earth. Yet it is by no means a tale that celebrates unbridled force. Violence is permissible only under specific conditions. All of the Just War criteria are present in the text, though not consolidated in one place. In order for violence to be just in the V almīki R am ayan . a, there must be adequate cause. These include restoration of cosmic order, punishment of evil doers, protection of those under attack, and self-defense. Although other key Hindu texts go so far as to permit force for the purpose of conquest , the V almīki R am ayan . a does not give righteous examples of such.
As in Just War, there must be the right intention, namely preservation of the welfare of others and society in general. The force must be authorized and applied by proper authority, in this case, the ruling members of the ks . atriya class. There must also be a net benefit for society or at least the absence of senseless loss. The text expresses the need for proportionality between the amount of force wielded and the gravity of the offense. Also, violence must be the last resort, occurring only once peaceful stratagems (three are commonly cited) have been exhausted. Additionally, a warrior must not harm civilians, a norm which is increasingly being asserted in Western military circles.
There are, of course, differences between the Just War model and the treatment of violence in the V almīki R am ayan . a, incongruities which are compounded by the fact that the Just War tradition includes various interpretations of its criteria. Four differences can be clearly identified. First, the epic tells us that ks . atriyas (the ruler and warrior caste) may wield weapons and apply force for punishment as well as protection. By contrast, contemporary Just War thinking (National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1983) and international law (United Nations Charter) do not make provisions for punishment per se. 21 Secondly, international law disallows conquest but allows for selfdefense when an armed attack has occurred on a state (UN Charter, Article 51). However, in modern Just War discourse, the legitimacy of preemptive self-defense is highly debatable, though the Charter 21 Torkel Brekke (2004) makes a notable contribution to the relationship between war and punishment in the context of classical Indian tradition of statecraft, as represented in Kaut . ilya's Arthaś astra. It is noteworthy, however, that whereas the ethics of prudence is valorized in this tradition, the epic tradition, in stark contrast, stanchly valorizes the ethic of chivalry over prudence.
provisions speak against it. The V almīki R am ayan . a offers no examples of preemptive self-defense, but it does allow for wars of conquest, though R am a does not avail himself of that right. Thirdly, legitimate authority under contemporary Just War thinking can be either the national authority, the international authority, or both. Under the UN Charter, the international authority that has a monopoly on the use of force is the UN Security Council. Obviously, there is no equivalent organizational body in the world of the R am ayan . a; however, the use of counsels therein might be considered analogous to national authorities ( parliaments). The ruler and counselors are determined by caste in the rules of that system, though this would be taboo today. Fourthly, the rules of combat represented in the epic differ from their modern counterpart insofar as only combatants of equal advantage may rightly engage one another, whereas modern warfare stipulates no such standards. Indeed, in epic warfare, one could not even engage a combatant from aboard a chariot unless he is similarly mounted, yet modern Just War discourse does not even prohibit the air launch of missiles on ground targets.
This study nevertheless demonstrates the remarkable affinity between the Just War criteria and the sanction of violence in the V almīki R am ayan . a. The ancient Indian justifications for force found therein, which may very well prefigure their Western counterparts, appear quite compatible with modern Western notions on morally acceptable force. The fact that all seven Just War criteria are traceable in the ancient Sanskrit epic strongly suggests that elements inherent in the Just War model are not as culturally defined as one might think. The counter-examples found in the text (e.g., the hero R ama's harsh slaying of V alin) are presented in a way that shows the moral tension and does not obviate the concern. These examples actually reinforce the value of the Just War criteria. The authors of the V almīki R am ayan . a, from so distant historical, geographical, and cultural spheres, exert so much effort on specifying the conditions legitimizing warfare, suggesting a universality to the human anxiety concerning the ancient enterprise of organized violence.
Despite its remarkable compatibility with the components of Just War ideology, the text evades a categorical "presumption of peace" for the warrior class, whose caste duty is to fight. However, this is not to say that the maintenance of peace is presumed to be of no value in the text. It would be impossible to be so concerned with the justification and systemization of violence without an underlying interest in peace. Why else would the authors of the text exert so much effort discoursing on the justification for violence had peace not been of great value? AHIM . SĀ: THE RĀMĀYAN . A'S "PRESUMPTION OF PEACE" John Brockington (2004) notes that the word ahim . s a appears only twice in the text of the V almīki R am ayan . a. The absence of the term ahim . s a, however, in no way denotes the absence of an esteem for nonviolence. Sīt a is the primary but not exclusive proponent of nonviolence within the text. At one point, she describes R ama as possessing all virtues, including "ahim . s a" (VI.23.31). In the forest, she requests that R ama not harm the r aks . asas unless he is provoked. Moreover, once the great war is over and Hanum an recovers her from R avan . a's private grove, Hanum an asks permission to slaughter the she-demons who have been tormenting Sīt a over the past year (VI.101.23-VI.101.25). The compassionate Sīt a refuses to consent, seeking neither vengeance nor punishment of her tormenters. She rather embodies an ideal of peace and forbearance, sagaciously invoking ś astric injunctions in her speech to Hanum an as follows (VI.101.34-VI.101.37):
There is an ancient verse in keeping with righteousness that a bear once recited in the presence of a tiger. . . . "A superior person never requites evil on the part of evildoers with evil". . . . A noble person must act compassionately whether people are wicked, virtuous, or even deserving of death. For, leaping monkey, no one is entirely innocent. One should not harm r aks . asas, who can take on any form at will and take pleasure in injuring people, even when they do evil.
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While punishment is well within the parameters of her dharma, Sīt a instead espouses the loftier moral precept of ahim . s a. Sīt a, however, is not alone in her esteem for nonviolence. R ama also expresses qualms about the use of violent force, which is especially remarkable given his duty as a warrior. Despite his right of succession, R ama eschews Laks . man . a's suggestion of using force to seize the throne. 23 At the conclusion of Book II (Ayodhy ak an . d . a), when we find R ama at the outskirts of Ayodhy a about to commence his exile, the Brahmin J ab ali presents 22 23 Unlike the heroes of the Mah abh arata, for example, R ama remains entirely unwilling to combat his kin for worldly rewards. R ama, on the other hand, asks incredulously, "How, after all, could a son kill his father, whatever the extremity, or a brother his brother, Saumitri, his very own breath of life?" (katham . nu putr ah . pitaram . hanyuh . kasy am . cid apadi bhr at a v a bhr ataram . hany at saumitre pr anam atmanah . II.91.6).
R ama with a harsh critique of ascetic values, arguing that they are mere conceits contrived by the priestly class. He urges R ama to relinquish his superstitious notions and return to society and pursue a life of worldly enjoyment at the court of Ayodhy a (II.100.2-II.100.17). R ama, in turn, explicitly declares that he rejects the ks . atriya code where "righteousness and unrighteousness go hand in hand, a code that only debased, vicious, covetous and evil men observe" (ks . atram . dharmam aham . tyaks . ye hy adharmam . dharmasam . hitam ks . udrair nr . śam . sair lubdhaiś ca sevitam . p apakarmabhih . , II.101.20). In denouncing the warrior code, R ama implicitly extols nonviolence. His restraint and passivity are valorized, despite the threat they pose for his social caste duty as a warrior. R ama does not even consider defending his own throne with force while at Ayodhy a.
R ama openly engages in violence only while away from "civilization," far from Ayodhy a and the sphere of utopian human order. In exile, he regularly employs violence in order to protect sages, slay several demons, slaughter a usurper monkey-king, and wage war against the r aks . asas in order to regain his abducted wife. R ama is valorized for defeating his wife's captor, R avan . a, who is the embodiment of evil. Violence never erupts in Ayodhy a, nor does R ama ever engage in combat with human beings. The warrior-king only exercises the use of force away from Ayodhy a. He only combats r aks . asas and v anaras and these encounters occur only in the wilderness: in Kis . kindh a, which is the city of the v anaras, and in Laṅk a, the city of the r aks . asas. Violence becomes a recourse for dealing with the demonic and the animal, "quite literally, the strategy of the inhuman" (Pollock 1986: 20) . However, the values that V almīki articulates through R ama's interaction with the r aks . asas and v anaras are obviously meant to apply equally (if not more so) to the human world. Recall that V almīki voices sage war counsel via the demons at the court of Laṅk a, which itself is described as possessing a highly sophisticated and refined social culture. Also, R ama holds the v anaras accountable to human social values, to which they themselves appear to adhere; R ama rebukes Sugrīva for not keeping true to his word, and V alin for adultery. The epic consistently holds these nonhuman characters to highly refined human standards. They are not mere ogres and apes living in depravity: both species of nonhuman foils are described as living highly civilized lives, particularly the r aks . asas. Furthermore, the use of nonhuman interlocutors serves to preserve the idyllic status of Ayodhy a, of which peace is a crucial element.
V almīki portrays R ama as the ideal human even at the expense of being the ideal warrior, since at times nonviolence takes ethical priority over sanctioned violence. At the very onset of the epic, V almīki questions the great sage N arada about the ideal man, i.e., one "who is benevolent to all creatures" (sarvabhūtes . u ko hitah . , I.1.3), yet "who when his fury is aroused in battle is feared even by the gods" (kasya bibhyati dev aś ca j ataros . asya sam . yuge, I.1.4). N arada responds with a glowing description of R ama, whom he describes as "the protector of all living things and the guardian of righteousness [and] versed in the science of arms" (raks . it a jīvalokasya dharmasya pariraks . it a . . . dhanurvede ca nis . t . hitah . , I.1.13). R ama is extolled as a great warrior, a champion of the underprivileged, and a defender of the devout, yet he is also described as "always even-tempered and kind-spoken, [and as one who] would ignore a hundred injuries, so great was his self-control" (sa hi nityam . praś ant atm a mr . dupūrvam . ca bh as . ate ucyam ano 'pi parus . am . nottaram . pratipadyate; katham . cid upak aren . a kr . tenaikena tus . yati na smaraty apak ar an . am . śatam apy atmavattay a, II.1.15-16). Yet the text unambiguously states that R ama's martial prowess is unequalled: indeed, we are told that "in his wrath he resembles the fire [of destruction] at the end of time" (k al agnisadr . śah . krodhe, I.1.17). He conquers many foes throughout his legendary career. Yet he advocates passivity on several important occasions, subverting his social duty in favor of the doctrine of nonviolence. The V almīki R am ayan . a extols sagacious equanimity in tandem with martial prowess. Thus, the formidable prince-regent is content to live in the forest in ascetic garb for fourteen years. The V almīki R am ayan . a celebrates Ayodhy a as the ideal state and R ama as the ideal warrior who engages in combat for a righteous cause, in a righteous fashion. However, R ama is well-endowed with moral ideals of nonviolence, tolerance, equanimity, self-restraint, forgiveness, etc., thereby rendering our hero an intriguing champion of peace. The V almīki R am ayan . a engages the tension between legitimizing and reproaching the use of force. This dichotomy is at the heart of the tradition as enshrined in the tensions between ascetics and kings, and br ahman . as and ks . atriyas. The text is consciously both world-affirming and world-denying, which helps to account for its poignant social relevance for twenty-five centuries: Hinduism to this day preserves both ideals, and thus preserves this tale which speaks to both.
The presumption of peace, expressed through the motif of ahim . s a, dominates the epic's vision of the ideal society. The ultimate state is a peaceful one, as symbolized by the utopic Ayodhy a. Combat occurs only under certain conditions, the foremost of which is Just Cause, including the restoration of dharma (righteousness). It is this very prerequisite which defines the valor of the hero of the R am ayan . a, since R ama fights for righteousness, dharma itself, fulfilling his function as avat ara by quelling the demonic forces and restoring cosmic balance. This rebalancing of cosmic and social order entails the establishment of peace, corresponding to the Just War notion of fighting only in order to achieve peace. Given the concerns entertained by the authors of the V almīki R am ayan . a regarding the legitimization of violence, this ancient Indian epic exhibits a remarkable adherence to both the spirit and criteria of the modern Just War model. It is our hope that this is one of many possible contributions toward rendering audible Hindu voices in the global conversation on the justifications for the use of force.
